From response and adaptation to learning, agency and contribution: making the theory of practice architectures dangerous

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Abstract
What is higher education praxis in a world beset by crises? Sjølie et al. (2020) explore this in relation to academics’ learning during the Covid-19 pandemic, using the theory of practice architectures, to highlight key responses and adaptations to the Coronavirus pandemic. I offer a re-reading of their cases of changing practice, challenging a sense of being accepting of, resigned to, and unfolding ‘under’ given circumstances. Instead, I highlight agentic, transformative praxis, where people act individually and collectively towards alternative futures. Drawing on Stetsenko’s transformative activist stance, I point to ways the theory of practice architectures might be put to work ‘dangerously’, as part of a struggle for a better world. Envisioning a reinvigoration of a politically charged theory of practice architectures, I argue that it offers particular value through the concept of learning as coming to practise differently, sharpened through a notion of contribution rather than participation.

Keywords: agency, learning, pandemic, practice architectures, praxis, transformation

Introduction
When confronted with crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, it is important to consider how our practices change in light of new circumstances and conditions. This is what Sjølie et al. (2020) offer with respect to the learning of academics as the pandemic unfolded. In this paper I offer a re-reading of their account, arguing that there is a need to shift the frame from response and adaptation to learning, agency and contribution: the praxis of higher education should explicitly adopt a more committed and transformative orientation. This can be traced in Sjolie et al.’s cases and the theoretical framework they apply. Agency and contribution are
consistent with the theory of practice architectures (TPA), capturing aspects of its transformative spirit that risk being downplayed through a focus on response and adaptation.

I draw on Stetsenko’s (2017, 2020b) transformative activist stance (TAS) in order to tease out an alternative reading of Sjølie et al.’s paper, one where struggle towards the future is more prominent, rather than adaptation to given (albeit extraordinary, in the context of the global pandemic) circumstances. My argument is not that TPA and TAS should be merged, nor is my purpose to compare and contrast the theory. My intention is to bring into relief features and potential inherent in TPA by taking up cues from Stetsenko’s work. Specifically, the overt political ethic-political commitments in TAS can be mobilised to strengthen collective and committed aspects of TPA, guard against TPA being taken up in banal ways, and help to make the theory of practice architectures ‘dangerous again, that is, useful in the struggle for a better world’ (Stetsenko, 2020c, p. 7).

Sjølie et al. (2020) explore how they, as academics ‘have come to practise differently under the abrupt changes caused by responses to the Coronavirus pandemic’ (p. 85). They present cases from Norway, Finland, Sweden and Australia, outlining how the pandemic affected their institutions and professional practices, reflecting on their learning in this process. The cases focus on shifts to working from home and online teaching, and the huge disruptions, constraints and demands that were confronted. This points to the significant accomplishment of keeping going. That academic practices were possible or more precisely, made possible, should not be taken for granted, given that many people within and beyond higher education found themselves excluded from the possibility of practising, as institutions shut down, workers were furloughed, and jobs were lost. We must remember the structural privileges and protections that made continuing in work possible.

**Learning in the theory of practice architectures**

Learning is framed by Sjølie et al. (2020) as a matter of coming to practise differently (Kemmis, 2019b, 2021). This reflects recent developments in the theory of practice architectures, refining notions of learning articulated earlier within this perspective. Learning had been discussed previously as being stirred into practices (Kemmis et al., 2014, 2017; Mahon, Francisco, & Lloyd, 2017). Later, Kemmis remarked:

I now think the notion of coming to know how to go on in a practice encompasses and improves upon the notions of
being initiated into practices and being stirred into practices. It is more inclusive, and allows for the case where B, the learner, is learning alone, without an A to do the showing or teaching or initiating or stirring. (Kemmis, 2019a, p. 123 [emphasis in original]).

This revision signals a subtle shift in direction that is taken further in the concept of learning as coming to practise differently. The shift is towards a more active role and a more central focus on difference. Being stirred in can be read as passive, pointing to questions as to whom or what is doing the stirring. The idea of coming to know how to go on points to an idea of change—at least for the person coming to know. This resonates with what Hager (2011) describes as a third tranche of theories of workplace learning that go beyond metaphors of acquisition and participation to focus instead on emergence and becoming. There is a clear sense of becoming (different) in Kemmis’ (2019a) clarification.

Sjølie et al. (2020) deploy a subsequent revision that takes this shift further. Coming to practise differently suggest there is both a ‘becoming’ for the learner, and that the practice itself may be changing (Kemmis, 2021). The distinct possibility that the person might contribute to changes in practice is raised, going beyond learning as a question of changing one’s actions in order to fit or ‘go on’ appropriately in an existing practice. This speaks to a shift in the focus among practice theorists from relationality to social change (see Schatzki, 2019) — questions of practice are increasingly being mobilised to understand not how the world is, but how it comes to be. It is here where the concept of learning within TPA is brought into closer alignment with its longstanding critical and emancipatory tenor. This opens up opportunities to reinvigorate TPA, to put it to work more ‘dangerously’, moving us towards alternative, preferable futures.

The revised concept of learning reflects more precisely and explicitly something that has always been there in TPA. Referring to Aristotelian notions of dispositions, Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008) foregrounded not only being informed, technically skilful and acting rightly (the dispositions of epistēmē, technē and phronēsis), but also a critical disposition to overcome injustice and suffering. Practices are projective in their nature, moving towards something. That something is not given, it must be taken, and taken up. From its onset, the TPA has explicitly pointed to a sense of practices changing, and of people having a responsibility in that regard. The revised concept brings learning into better alignment with aspects that retain not just the possibility of practice change, but a responsibility in this regard. This interpretation is further supported by Kemmis’ definition of practice, referred to in Sjølie et al.’s (2020) paper:
A form of human action in history, in which particular activities (doings) are comprehensible in terms of particular ideas and talk (sayings), and when the people involved are distributed in particular kinds of relationships (relatings), and when this combination of sayings, doings and relatings ‘hangs together’ in the project of the practice (the ends and purposes that motivate the practice). (Kemmis, 2019a, p. 13)

The TPA treats learning as situated in particular sites, shaped by historical conditions which shape the what, how and why of people’s practices (Sjølie et al., 2020). The TPA conceptualises this shaping dialectically. Practices are held in place by combinations of arrangements that form practice architectures—cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political. Practices comprise sayings, doings and relatings that uphold, shape and potentially reshape the architectures that shape them (Kemmis et al., 2014). In this position, Kemmis joins other practice theorists such as Schatzki (2002, 2010, 2019) in conceptualising practices as both prefigured and emergent—shaped but not determined, ever open to the possibility of change (see Hopwood, 2016; Kemmis & Grootenboer, 2008).

Response and adaptation

Sjølie et al.’s (2020) list of what they learned to differently is characterised by adaptation and response. This undoubtedly reflects, accurately, the unprecedented and unavoidable disruptions and restrictions caused by the pandemic. The pandemic was such a profound shock to our lives and practices that a sense of adaptation is so strong, especially given that the piece was written while these adaptations were still being figured out. As a series of first-person narratives, the paper reflects the unique access each author had to the events in their own working and family lives, allowing them to acknowledge feelings of strangeness, longing, guilt, and so on. The feelings that the changes in practice reflected a forced accommodation of an unwelcome, indeed deeply worrying, intrusion, are indeed ones I recognise myself from that time.

Sjølie et al.’s (2020) account focuses on accommodating what was no longer possible, using unfamiliar tools in order to act amid novel constraints: adapting to online meetings when face-to-face was not possible, using breakout rooms in Zoom instead of small groups in a classroom, recruiting research participants through phone or zoom instead of in person, working from (shared) home spaces when the office was closed. The framing is one of lost possibility, being ‘pushed into’ online teaching
(p. 89), ‘forced to think’ (p. 90) in different ways, or ‘comply’ with required changes (p. 99), being ‘obliged to adapt our practices’ (p. 101).

The pandemic represented an extraordinary disruption to, imposition on, and threat to higher education practices, indeed to human life. Such responses, ways of making do, and finding our way were crucial in enabling us to carry on and maintain things that mattered. My argument is that learning and agency during the pandemic involved more than being compelled to act differently under given circumstances: there were instances where stands were taken, and commitments made. This may often have been entangled with adaptive changes, but I suggest TPA becomes most valuable to us when we use it to discern—even if only in glimpses and suggestions—praxis, critique and envisioning of futures that are not defined purely by coping with the pandemic but reflect other political and ethical commitments.

A conservative and preservative feel extends into the way Sjølie et al. (2020) engage the theory of practice architectures. Referring to learning to work from home, they note ‘[t]he practice architectures that provided conditions of possibility for academic work in the office were replaced by practice architectures designed to support the practices of home life’ (p. 97). This is an important insight. When working from home we do not simply carry a laptop and continue—the practice unfolds amid different architectures that hold different things in place, or hold similar things in place differently. The sense of response and adaptation is clear here when the analysis refers to academic practices being practised differently ‘to fit around home schooling and family management practices’ (p. 97, emphasis added). This language of response, adaptation, obligation, risks us failing to notice more agentic, committed and contributive aspects of learning and praxis. Towards the end of the paper, the authors note:

The academics in the case stories did their best to learn to practise differently under the new circumstances of the time of the Coronavirus, and they did their best to resituate their practices so they could be sustained in new sites in ways that do not diminish the meaningful in academic work. (Sjølie et al., 2020, p. 97, emphases in original)

Key here is the phrase ‘under the new circumstances’. This conveys circumstances as a given, something immutable, immovable and incontestable. New laws or institutional directives indeed curtailed or prohibited practices. However, the theory of practice architectures has, from the outset, recognised the importance of circumstances in shaping practices while simultaneously holding that these are open and themselves subject to being shaped by people enacting practices. In the next section, I outline Stetsenko’s (2017, 2020a-d) transformative activist stance as a
A transformative activist stance

Stetsenko’s transformative activist stance (TAS) connects ontology, epistemology and praxis, foregrounding agency in a theory of mind, personhood, development and learning that is resolutely non-dualist, deeply dialectical, and flagrantly partisan (see Stetsenko, 2008, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020a-d). TAS builds closely on Vygotsky, critical pedagogy (Freire), Bakhtin’s dialogism, feminism and the philosophy of practice (Stetsenko, 2020a). Stetsenko (2016) notes that TAS’ connection between theory, research and philosophy resonates with praxis-related research and the philosophy of practice, citing Kemmis (2010). She writes: ‘At stake in such approaches … is the recovery of practical philosophy which moves the primary locus of ethical-philosophical debates into practical contexts’ (2016, pp. s34-s35). This is precisely the aspect that I take up in the re-reading of Sjølie et al.’s paper and take up as a basis to call for a reinvigoration of TPA, building on a recent conceptualization of learning: a focus not just on change, but on a morally and politically charged process of things coming to be done differently. The following paragraphs elaborate these most relevant features of TAS.

TAS echoes the work Vygotsky and his colleagues in its alignment with a Marxist ethos of building a society in solidarity with others (Stetsenko, 2020b, 2020c). This holds that people attain freedom in and through the self-realisation of others, where this self-realisation is carried out in solidarity and coordination with that of others and is itself a path towards the self-realisation of others. TAS is committed to directing social resources for the benefit of everyone, particularly those marginalised and oppressed, especially through education and also in other venues including union organising. This is important in distinguishing TAS from approaches that focus on participation in practices:

Most critically, what is suggested by the transformative approach is yet another shift—a transition from participation (as derived from the notion of dwelling in the present and adapting to it) to contribution—a more active and activist stance implying that all acts of being, knowing, and doing take place at the sites of ideological struggles and are part and parcel of such struggles. (Stetsenko, 2017, p. 11, emphasis added)
The distinction between participation and contribution can help us sharpen the notion of learning in TPA. Kemmis’ (2019b, 2021) recent revisions, foreground learning as coming to practise differently, already open up more explicitly a notion that learning might result in more than doing what others already do, and instead contribute to difference and change. The idea of contribution suggests that we need to ask not just what differences are manifest, but where those differences take us, what responsibilities they enact, what commitments they advance, what futures they realise.

The following expression, which captures the heart of TAS, its transformative ethico-ontoepistemology:

It is directly through and in the process, and moreover, precisely as the process of people constantly transforming and co-creating their social world and thus moving beyond the status quo (rather than as an addition to it) that people simultaneously create and constantly transform their very life, therefore also changing themselves in fundamental ways while, also in and as this very process, becoming individually unique and gaining knowledge about themselves and the world. (Stetsenko, 2020a, pp. 11–12, emphasis in original)

Such formulations help us recognise ways to take up TPA in more politically engaged, future-oriented ways. Kemmis (2019a) emphasises the projects, ends and (moral) purposes of practices. When we consider learning as coming to practise differently, these ends and purposes do not disappear: the difference does not emerge in a political and moral vacuum. At issue is not just participation, but contribution, including the determination of direction—towards what are we contributing? Stetsenko is again helpful here, explaining how the horizons of the future ‘are not somehow delivered by any authority somewhere from high up, but instead have to be figured out by individuals and communities themselves’ (Stetsenko, 2020b, p. 734).

Also important in TAS is the emphasis on struggle and striving. Stetsenko explains ‘the primary emphasis is on struggle and striving—on people encountering, confronting, and overcoming the circumstances and conditions that are not so much given as taken up by people’ (2020a, p. 12, emphasis in original). Stetsenko (2020b) critiques the frequent posthuman retreat into political quietism and accommodation of the status quo, advocating more radical approaches that ‘reclaim human agency at the intersection of individual and collective planes,'
within a dialectically unified human praxis’ (p. 735). This reclaiming is not just a matter of theoretical nuance, but a fundamental shift, which Stetsenko argues…

… needs to be supported by scholarship that is explicitly activist and ready to take sides in the ongoing battles for the future while doing the work of imagining this future and committing to it, including through theorizing activism and conceptualizing agency at the intersection of individual and social dimensions. (Stetsenko, 2020d, p. 3)

The issue of handling the individual and social without losing either or collapsing one onto the other is crucial in understanding the significance of Kemmis’ (2021) notion of learning within the TPA. Kemmis, like Stetsenko, draws on dialectic thinking to accomplish this. A brief consideration of these features strengthens a view that coming to practise differently is both an individual and a social affair, and by virtue of its social implication, a non-neutral one. Kemmis (2019a) explains how the TPA embraces both an Aristotelian tradition of praxis (focused on morally informed, committed action), and a Hegelian-Marxian tradition of praxis as history-making, as action oriented towards changing society. Kemmis (2019a) draws on Marx’s third Thesis on Feuerbach, to specify dynamic dialectical relationships of mutual constitution between ‘individual’ sayings, doings and relatings, and ‘social’ arrangements:

Marx nevertheless felt that Feuerbach’s materialism remained incomplete: it omitted the role of people in making history. In the third Thesis, Marx thus draws attention not only to the notion that people are shaped by circumstances and upbringing (and that, therefore, changed people would be the products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing), but also to the role of people in this history: it is people who change circumstances, and people who educate educators (‘upbringers’). (Kemmis, 2019a, p. 28, emphasis in original)

Commitment and agency in academics’ learning in the pandemic

I will now highlight features of learning described by Sjølie et al. (2020) that counter the sense of adaptation under given circumstances. I suggest that the authors’ story is more than one of response, it is one of contribution to change,
novelty, solidarity and a re-imagining of the university, its values and its value. There are examples in their cases of agentic, committed action that challenge the givenness of the status quo, working towards sought-after futures—therefore reflecting features of Stetsenko’s transformative activist stance.

Sjølie et al. (2020) conclude that their learning in the time of the Coronavirus helped to … renew the communitarian character of academic life in the contexts in which we work. In learning to practise academic life and work differently, resitutating our practices to work from home and virtually, we also recovered what we most value in academic life and work: its intrinsically communitarian character. (Sjølie et al., 2020, p. 104)

We can see this clearly in the account from Norway, which highlights the importance of *dugnasdånd* in responses to the pandemic. *Dugnasdånd*, roughly translated as ‘the spirit of willingness to work together for a better community’ (p. 90), captures an idea of an individual *contribution* to a collective effort and the fact that this effort is about moving towards some kind of a desired, different state of affairs. The tenor here is not resigned acceptance of the status quo, of learning to deal with given circumstances, of practising ‘under’ conditions. It is rather about a collective—or even collectividual (Stetsenko, 2013) striving for and movement towards something different and better. In the language of the theory of practice architectures, *dugnasdånd* can be seen as an expression in language of a cultural tradition, a project that seeks to reshape practice architectures towards particular ends, guided by communitarian spirit. This is concretely manifest in the changes made to practises in order to engage participants in collaborative meetings and adopting new structures that clarified collective agreements and achievements. Adaptation alone would have ‘finished’ with the replacement of a physical meeting with a digital platform. However, a communitarian stance was taken, valuing engagement and processes of collectively determining what to do next. Changes resulting from ‘forced adaptation’ to the pandemic were also changes that contributed to the future.

In the Finnish case, we find the restrictions of the pandemic becoming a basis for different relationships between the author and young refugee research participants. This is not merely adaptive, but a change that is (also) shaped by a solidarity with others, a recognition of one’s privileged position, and a determination to continue in work that is valuable for its potential benefits to others. The project being launched in adapted format was not the end of the matter, but rather the start of something: ‘yet-to-come changes [that] might fundamentally
change my understanding of the focus and my positionality in this study’ (p. 91). The Finnish case also points to something similar in the idea of talkoot, which refers to unpaid, often semi-mandatory work for the common good. This recognises that individual worker’s struggles were part of ‘an even greater struggle that the declining economy will cause’ (p. 93). This manifest concretely in actions of letting go in order to focus on what mattered collectively, and a push towards more environmentally sustainable practices for the post-pandemic era. Again we see a collectived mot if even if the term itself is not used, and a sense not of acceptance, not even of resistance, but of striving towards alternative futures, through (I argue, agentic) actions in which individuals act in solidarity, in common striving, with others.

In the Swedish case contribution, agency and transcending the status quo are evident in the description of the academic supervisor initiating online fika meetings. Fika is a Swedish practice of taking a coffee break with others (and with sweet snacks), typically recognised as more a matter of socialising than caffeine intake. This might seem like a simple transfer of a practice from in-person to an online format, an act of preservation rather than contribution. With all the pressures and new demands, the ‘given’ could have been to let go of fika, but this was not done. Keeping it going took a stance that valued social connection. Coming to practise fika differently involved taking it up as a site to ‘check in’ on colleagues in ways that would have been done through other practices prior to the pandemic. Practising fika changed from its given in-person routine to light relief from the gravity of the pandemic; to a means of connection at a time of profound disconnection. This was more than an adaptation, a shift in platform. The online, and then hybrid, versions of fika were not just the same practice enacted via a different platform. The way of doing fika changed (logging on rather than turning up), but fika itself changed. Those involved contributed to something, new, based on their valuing connection with one another.

In the Australian case there are other signs of stance-taking, commitment, and emergence, not just accommodation and acceptance. The provision of support to children, investing time and emotional energy that might otherwise have been devoted to work was framed as a decision, indicating that the author took a stance, made a values-based choice, including envisioned futures for her children, and acted on it. The development of novel possibilities is evident in reflections on how, when other activities were curtailed during lockdown, new practices of gardening led to insights informing writing and teaching that ‘may not have emerged otherwise’ (p. 96).

Thus, I argue that the authors did not only use substantive, technical and moral dispositions as a compass for their learning. We find more than glimpses of praxis guided by critical and emancipatory dispositions, agentic actions that went
beyond the status quo and towards sought-after futures. This is entirely consistent with the framing proposed by Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008), and brings us closer to Stetsenko’s (2017, 2020a, 2020b) transformative activist stance. Sjølie et al.’s (2020) remark that the cases they share suggest that their learning in the pandemic helped to renew the communitarian character of academic life is significant. I argue that this formulation downplays the significance of their learning. This did not just recover something but involved a collectivindual commitment to the future that transcended the disruptions, demands and constraints of the Coronavirus. The authors refer to ‘holding on to what is most important in our work as academics—doing meaningful, productive, praxis-oriented word’ (p. 101). Arguably their stories are not just of holding on to what was already present, but of committing to the future and contributing to change. When they conclude that their sense of self has been strengthened in this process, they are in concert with Stetsenko’s (2020c) argument that it is in the very process of acting to change the world that we change ourselves.

Conclusions

I have highlighted ways in which the analysis Sjølie et al. (2020) present of academics’ learning in the early months of the Coronavirus pandemic points to agentic, committed and future-making qualities. This supersedes—carrying forward but also adding to—aspects that focus on response and adaptation ‘under’ given circumstances. The intrusions of the pandemic in working and everyday lives can be accounted for while simultaneously examining how higher education praxis need not be confined to accepting the status quo, but can also involve challenging it, taking steps towards alternative futures.

Such a view is entirely consistent with the theory of practice architectures. It critically extends the direction that Kemmis (e.g., 2019a, 2019b, 2021) has signalled in revisions to the way learning is conceptualised within TPA, uplifting the critical and emancipatory disposition that is key to TPA (Kemmis & Grootenboer, 2008; see also Hopwood, 2017). I argue we need to make the TPA dangerous (again), and to do so we need analyses that foreground learning in connection with commitment, practices that realise the future that ought to be.

The TPA is less a theory of how practices are, and more a theory of how they come to be, and how they could be. It challenges an approach to practice change that focuses on fixing deficiencies in individuals, and instead points to the need to address cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements—without notions of individual and collective responsibility being lost. Kemmis’ longstanding commitment to action research (e.g., Kemmis & McTaggart, 2005), and critical
stance (Carr & Kemmis, 1986) help to contextualise the TPA in this way. TAS (Stetsenko, 2017) can prompt those working with TPA to think about coming to practise differently in terms of action in solidarity with others, towards sought-after futures.

Recent revisions to the concept of learning within TPA provide a foundation for doing this. A shift from being stirred into practices, to learning how to go on, to coming to practise differently (Kemmis, 2021) heralds a more explicit focus on the importance of learning in both individual and social change. Stetsenko’s TAS points to ways we might take this idea up with analytical sharpness, cuing us to matters of contribution rather than participation. When concerned with contribution, we must confront questions about the projects, ends and moral purposes of practices, and the bearing that coming to practise differently has upon those.

Through TPA we can hold both individuals and wider arrangements in play without resorting to false dichotomies. Kemmis and Grootenboer (2008) wrote of a ‘critical disposition to overcome irrationality, injustice and suffering through critical reflection and emancipatory action in concert with others’ (p. 39). There is a subtle but important distinction between being critical of the status quo or the circumstances ‘under’ which one acts, and taking a committed stand that refuses to accept the givenness of the status quo or the futures to which it points. Herein lies a further way in which TAS might provide inspiration for a reinvigorated (dangerous) TPA. TAS demands a resolute partisanship, in the sense of a commitment to recognising the major crises that affect higher education (or any other aspect of society), recognise the socio-political upheavals of our times, without accepting them as faits accomplis. Kemmis wrote this poem:

Since Marx, we have known that you and I make history but not under circumstances of our own choosing. (Kemmis, 2019a, p. 99)

While we may not choose these circumstances, embedded as we are in history, we need not be resigned to them either: circumstances are of our collective, contributory making (Stetsenko, 2017). Sjølie et al. (2020) indeed point to this, at precisely a moment when circumstances seem so beyond our control:

That the unthinkable so quickly became realities in the corona pandemic, highlights not only how responsive, resourceful, and proactive academics can be, but also that university practice architectures, which appear to be unchangeable and inevitable, may be more malleable than we think. This is a source of hope for those deeply concerned
about the present state of affairs in higher education and striving to change prevailing conditions. (Sjølie et al., 2020, p. 103)

Coming to practise differently could involve changes that are wholly adaptive and responsive, accepting of the status quo, adjusting to what is (apparently) given. I argue that the longstanding critical and emancipatory spirit of the TPA require us to sharpen this notion by explicitly connecting it with commitment, moral responsibility and transformation (all things that are not new to the TPA). Stetsenko’s notion of contribution rather than participation offers a helpful way to do this. If we connect coming to practise differently with a sense of contribution, then we can grasp learning in politically and ethically charged ways, invoking agency as individuals matter in their contribution to something larger. Through its notion of cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements, the TPA provides a basis to understanding how such contributions become possible. Individuals do not contribute in a vacuum, but rather do so by taking up the resources (tools, in Stetsenko’s language) that are made available to them.

In this we find a distinctive agenda for praxis in higher education. Realising the transformative potential of working with the theory of practice architectures, requires a resolutely committed and partisan stance, deploying the theory of practice architectures to probe the development and emergence of means through which people are able, in solidarity with others, to go beyond adaptation and response, reject quiet acceptance and acquiescence, and move instead towards agency, contribution and transformation. This agenda lives up to the spirit of the theory of practice architectures and resonates with Sjølie et al.’s (2020) commitments to communitarian values and aspirations in higher education.

Taking cues from Stetsenko’s transformative activist stance can help to fold the theory of practice architectures into movements of resistance in the face of varied crises of late capitalism, and guard against the risk that the theory falls into a ‘banal, biscuit-box’ version, and instead be made ‘dangerous again, that is, useful in the struggle for a better world’ (Stetsenko, 2020c, p. 7).

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank members of the Sydney/Wollongong PEP Reading Group. This formed in 2020 as a means to exchange ideas about pedagogy, education and praxis (PEP). In particular thanks are given to Amanda Lizier and Christine Grice for their facilitation of the group, and all those who contributed to the meeting in which Sjølie et al.’s (2020) paper, and a draft of this paper were discussed. I am also grateful to
Anna Stetsenko (City University of New York), for her frequent and generous dialogue, and for her detailed feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. I also appreciate the constructive comments from the reviewer, which led to a substantial sharpening of the argument.
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References


